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Abstract
I argue that bounded agents face a systematic accuracy-coherence tradeoff in cognition.
Agents must choose whether to structure their cognition in ways likely to promote
coherence or accuracy. I illustrate the accuracy-coherence tradeoff by showing how
it arises out of at least two component tradeoffs: a coherence-complexity tradeoff be-
tween coherence and cognitive complexity, and a coherence-variety tradeoff between
coherence and strategic variety. These tradeoffs give rise to an accuracy-coherence
tradeoff because privileging coherence over complexity or strategic variety often leads
to a corresponding reduction in accuracy. I conclude with a discussion of two norma-
tive consequences for the study of bounded rationality: the importance of procedural
rationality and the role of coherence in theories of bounded rationality.
1 Introduction
It is often held that cognitively unbounded agents are rationally required to satisfy a range
of coherence requirements. For example, unbounded agents should have probabilistically
coherent credences, logically consistent beliefs, and transitive preferences.
Theories of bounded rationality tend to relax the requirement of full coherence. This
is done because bounded agents are often unable to achieve full coherence. Nevertheless,
many theorists hold that there is a strong normative role for coherence in the theory of
bounded rationality (Staffel 2020; Zynda 1996). For example, bounded agents might be
rationally required to be as coherent as possible given their limitations.
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In support of the normative importance of coherence, it has recently been shown how
traditional arguments in favor of full coherence requirements on unbounded agents can be
generalized to support approximate coherence requirements on bounded agents. These
include arguments from accuracy-dominance (De Bona and Staffel 2017, 2018; Staffel 2020)
and vulnerability to book (Schervish et al. 2000, 2002, 2003; Staffel 2015).
At the same time, some leading scientific approaches to bounded rationality place
less emphasis on coherence (Arkes et al. 2016).1 One such approach holds that bounded
agents should use a toolbox of fast-and-frugal heuristics which make efficient and accurate
judgments at the price of significant vulnerability to incoherence (Gigerenzer and Selten
2001). What could be said in favor of this looser role for coherence in the theory of
bounded rationality?
A defining feature of bounded rationality is the existence of tradeoffs. Most famously,
there is often an accuracy-effort tradeoff between cognitive strategies (Johnson and Payne
1985).2 The cognitive strategies which produce the most accurate judgments or the best
decisions tend to be among the most effortful strategies available. As a result, bounded
agents need to select cognitive strategies which strike a good balance between accuracy
and effortfulness.
In this paper, I argue that bounded agents face a comparably systematic accuracy-
coherence tradeoff. The strategies which produce the most accurate judgments or the best
decisions come apart from the most coherent strategies. If the existence of an accuracy-
coherence tradeoff can be demonstrated, it will put some pressure against the relationship
between bounded rationality and approximate coherence by showing that agents often
pay a price in accuracy for gained coherence.
Here is the plan. Section 2 clarifies what it means to say that there is an accuracy-
coherence tradeoff in cognition. Section 3 introduces the accuracy-coherence tradeoff
using an extended example. Sections 4-5 illustrate two of the cognitive factors driving the
1For philosophical overviews of the ensuing debates, see Rysiew (2008) and Sturm (2012).
2Sometimes there is no accuracy-effort tradeoff. In some situations, the most accurate strategies are also
among the most frugal (Geman et al. 1992; Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009; Wheeler forthcoming).
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accuracy-effort tradeoff: cognitive complexity and strategic variety. Section 6 resolves a
puzzle about the location of the accuracy-coherence tradeoff. Section 7 uses the resolution
of this puzzle to draw lessons about the shape and extension of coherence-based normative
theories.
2 Clarifying the target
What does it mean to say that bounded agents face an accuracy-coherence tradeoff? In
this section, I offer five remarks to clarify my target, building on the analogy between the
accuracy-effort and accuracy-coherence tradeoffs.
First, the term ‘accuracy-effort tradeoff’ is standardly used to denote two different
phenomena. On the one hand, it denotes an accuracy-effort tradeoff in which the accuracy
of our judgments, measured perhaps by a scoring rule, trades off against the effort of
making judgments. On the other hand, it denotes a quality-effort tradeoff in which the
quality of our decisions, measured perhaps by a utility function, trades off against the
effort of making decisions. When clarity is of the essence, I break with tradition and use
the term ‘accuracy-effort tradeoff’ to designate only the first tradeoff. But it is no accident
that the accuracy-effort and quality-effort tradeoffs have been lumped together, since they
arise in similar cases and for structurally similar reasons. When an umbrella term is
needed, I hold with tradition in using the term ‘accuracy-effort tradeoff’ to denote both of
these component tradeoffs.
Similarly, the term ‘accuracy-coherence tradeoff’ encompasses both an accuracy-
coherence tradeoff in judgment and a quality-coherence tradeoff in decisionmaking. When
clarity is required, I reserve the term ‘accuracy-coherence tradeoff’ for the first tradeoff
only. But we will see that the accuracy-coherence and quality-coherence tradeoffs arise
in similar cases and for structurally similar reasons. For this reason, I build on exist-
ing tradition and use the umbrella term ‘accuracy-coherence tradeoff’ to designate both
component tradeoffs when the meaning of this phrase is clear from context.
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Second, the accuracy-coherence tradeoff, like the accuracy-effort tradeoff, occurs at the
level of cognitive strategies rather than the judgments and decisions that they produce.
We might express the point expectationally.3 To say that there is an accuracy-coherence
tradeoff in cognition is to say that agents are often forced to choose between strategies with
better impacts on the expected coherence or expected accuracy of their beliefs, respectively.
When the processes in question directly issue in judgments, the expected accuracy and
coherence of a process will be the expected accuracy and coherence of the agent’s resulting
doxastic state. I am primarily concerned with examples of this form. We could extend the
terminology to talk about the expected accuracy and coherence of other processes such as
evidence-gathering in terms of their expected downstream contributions to the accuracy
or coherence of an agent’s beliefs, although this will not be my primary concern. Similar
glosses can be given for the quality-coherence tradeoff.
Third, the accuracy-coherence tradeoff, like the accuracy-effort tradeoff, occurs often
but not always. In some situations, the accuracy-effort tradeoff is nonexistent, or even
reversed: agents can improve the expected accuracy of their judgments by using less-
effortful cognitive processes (Geman et al. 1992; Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009). For this
reason, the most important task in studying the accuracy-effort tradeoff is to characterize
the conditions under which it occurs. Similarly, I argue that the accuracy-coherence
tradeoff often occurs, but not that it always occurs. The most important task is to identify
factors driving the accuracy-coherence tradeoff in cognition, and I argue that both strategic
variety (§4) and cognitive complexity (§5) fit the bill.
Fourth, the notion of coherence is notoriously fraught. For one thing, different theorists
employ a patchwork of at most roughly coextensional terms to pick out the phenomenon
of interest, including ‘coherence’, ‘consistency’, ‘structural rationality’, ‘axiomatic ratio-
nality’ (Gigerenzer forthcoming), and the ‘standard picture’ of rationality (Stein 1996). For
another, there is disagreement about which patterns of attitudes should count as incoher-
3If a non-expectational gloss is desired, we could also express the point in terms of the dispositions of
processes to produce accurate and coherent belief.
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ent. And in the practical domain, it is disputed which objects may count as incoherent:
choices, choice-dispositions, or preferences.
To cut through these debates, I give examples which can be phrased in terms of
attitudinal coherence involving judgments or preferences, but also rephrased using other
standard descriptions if desired. I focus on requirements widely agreed to characterize
coherent judgment and preference, such as the probability axioms and the requirement
that strict preferences be asymmetric. And I give a variety of examples, each drawing on
a different requirement of practical or theoretical coherence.
Fifth, because my concern is with processes of judgment and decisionmaking, most
of my examples have a diachronic flavor. This raises a natural objection: what seems
to be attitudinal incoherence could instead reflect changes of attitudes across time. For
example, if I choose X over Y at t1 and Y over X at t2, this might not show that I held the
incoherent preferences X  Y and Y  X together. I may have changed my preferences due
to learning, changing tastes, or transformative experience in the interim. To handle this
challenge, I discuss natural attempts to redescribe my examples by invoking preference
change and argue that these attempts fail.
Summing up, in its simplest form the accuracy-coherence tradeoff is an umbrella term
for a tradeoff between the expected accuracy and coherence of the judgments resulting
from a process of judgment formation, as well as a related tradeoff between the expected
quality and coherence of decisions resulting from a process of decisionmaking. The
accuracy-coherence tradeoff occurs often, but not always, and my project will be to illus-
trate two factors which may drive the accuracy-coherence tradeoff. When possible, I focus
on paradigmatic examples of practical or theoretical incoherence, describing the examples
in terms of attitudinal incoherence. And I argue against natural attempts to recast these
examples as diachronically coherent attitudinal change. With these remarks in mind, I
turn to an example designed to illustrate how the accuracy-coherence tradeoff arises (Sec-
tion 3), before exploring two factors which drive the accuracy-coherence tradeoff (Sections
4-5).
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3 An example: lexicographic and semilexicographic choice
To get a grip on the many ways in which accuracy and coherence trade off for bounded
agents, it will help to begin with an example from decisionmaking, then extend this
example to a structurally similar example in judgment formation. Suppose you are
buying a car. You might decide using lexicographic choice (Fishburn 1974). You would
order features of cars by their importance. Perhaps the most important feature is that it
has an automatic transmission; next most important is price; then other features such as
safety rating and comfort follow. You would compare the available cars by their most
important feature, choosing the car which scores best on this feature. If several cars score
just as well on this feature, for example because they all have an automatic transmission,
you would compare cars along the second-most-important feature, price, continuing in
this way until a decision was reached.
More formally, lexicographic choosers confront a choice set O = {o1, . . . , om}. They
select some decision cues c1, . . . , cn such as transmission type, price and safety rating, rank-
ordered by importance. Lexicographic choosers then estimate or retrieve from memory
the values f (oi, c j) of each option along each cue. For example, f (o3, c2) is the price of the
third car. For each cue ci, they determine a value function Vi ranking the goodness of each
value that ci can take. For example, perhaps V1(x) = 1 if x is ‘automatic’, and 0 otherwise.
If some option o maximizes V1, then o is chosen. Otherwise, the options maximizing V1
are compared according to V2, repeating until one option remains.
Lexicographic choice is quite a silly way to buy a car.4 Our lexicographic chooser will
always buy the cheapest automatic car unless two automatic cars are tied in price. A tra-
ditional and cognitively efficient way to improve upon lexicographic choice is semilexico-
graphic choice (Tversky 1969).5 Semilexicographic choice fixes for each i a small difference
4To be clear, the claim is that lexicographic choice is a silly way to buy a car, not that lexicographic choice
is always a silly way to make decisions.
5The version of semilexicographic choice that I present here is commonly studied in psychology and
judgment and decisionmaking fields. Some theorists have developed other notions of semilexicographic
choice (Manzini and Mariotti 2012).
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σi in value which will be ignored.6 For example, in the simple case where each Vi beyond
the first is the identity function, we might choose to ignore price differences under $1,000
and safety-differences no greater than one star. The turn to semilexicographic choice is
widely held to yield improvements in decision quality. A semilexicographic chooser will
not buy the cheapest automatic car if a comparably-priced automatic is significantly safer.
But semilexicographic choice is less coherent than lexicographic choice.7 To see the
problem, suppose that three automatic cars have the following costs and safety ratings.
Car A Car B Car C
Cost (Thousands of dollars) 19 18.6 17.8
Safety Rating (Stars) 4 2.5 1
If given the pairwise choice between Car A and Car B, our semilexicographic chooser will
pick Car A. Between Car B and Car C, she will choose Car B. And between Car C and Car
A, she will choose car C. It is natural to interpret this result as a collection of intransitive
preferences.
Lexicographic choice does not have this problem. The pairwise choices made by a
lexicographic chooser are always transitive. In this way, the move from lexicographic to
semilexicographic choice is an instance of the quality-coherence tradeoff. Going semilex-
icographic decreases the coherence of an agent’s decisions, but increases their quality.
The same tradeoff can be found in cases of judgment formation rather than decision-
making. Consider a binary judgment problem, such as judging which of two cities is
larger. A popular heuristic for binary judgment is take the best (TTB) (Gigerenzer and
Goldstein 1996). TTB instructs agents to identify a number of judgmental cues which are
relevant to the size of a city, such as the presence of an airport or its status as a national
capitol. Agents then retrieve or estimate values of each cue from memory, ordering cues
6That is, option o is eliminated at stage i just in case for some o′ we have Vi( f (o′, ci)) > Vi( f (o, ci)) + σi.
7The observation that semilexicographic choices can be intransitive suffices to show that semilexico-
graphic choice is vulnerable to some forms of incoherence that lexicographic choice avoids. By contrast,
any incoherence in lexicographic choice will also be an incoherence in semilexicographic choice, of which
lexicographic choice is a special case.
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by predictive validity.8 Agents compare cities along each cue, beginning with the most
valid cues, until they find one cue on which one city performs better than the other. They
then halt deliberation with the judgment that this city is larger.
In many contexts, TTB is an excellent way to form accurate judgments at low cognitive
cost. But TTB is precisely the judgmental analog of lexicographic choice, and for that
reason it suffers from the same vulnerability: a city which performs well on the highest-
ranking cue will always be judged larger than any other city, no matter how poorly it
performs on lower-ranking cues. Plausible ways of fixing this vulnerability purchase
increased accuracy at the expense of vulnerability to incoherence.9
One way to fix the problem would be to go semilexicographic, ignoring small differ-
ences along each judgmental cue. That would produce intransitive judgments of compar-
ative size in exactly the same way as before.10 Here is another bugfix. Number the cues
as c1, . . . , ck in descending order of predictive validity. For each cue ci, let the tally of ci
be 1 if ci favors City 1 being larger, −1 if ci favors City 2, and 0 otherwise. Going down
the list of cues, the running tally at i will be the sum t1 + · · · + ti of tallies from 1 to i. In
this language, TTB says to halt when the running tally hits ±1 and output the judgment
that the currently-favored city is larger. Generalizing, take the n-best (TTNB) would say
to halt when the running tally hits ±n for some fixed n, and output the judgment that
the currently-favored city is larger.11 Increasing n even moderately would go a long way
towards erasing the risk of favoring cities which perform abnormally well on the most
8The validity of cue ci is the probability that it successfully discriminates, given that it discrim-
inates at all. More formally, let A > B hold when city A is larger than city B, and A >i B
hold when A outperforms B on cue ci. Then within a reference class C, the validity of ci is
|{(X,Y) ∈ C × C : X > Y ∧ X >i Y}| / |{(X,Y) ∈ C × C : X >i Y}| .
9Like lexicographic choice, TTB is immune to the type of intransitivity illustrated below. It should also
be emphasized that in many contexts, TTB is already fairly accurate (Armstrong and Graefe 2012; Gigerenzer
and Goldstein 1996; Martignon and Hoffrage 2002).
10A bit more precisely, the agent judges of cities A,B,C that A is larger than B, B is larger than C, and C
is larger than A. Plausibly, most competent speakers also believe that comparative size is transitive, a belief
that is logically inconsistent with the previous three judgments.
11We will also need a tiebreaker stipulation, for example: after all cues are exhausted, the city with the
largest tally is judged larger, and no judgment is returned in the case of a tie.
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important cues.12
But TTNB also produces intransitive judgments of comparative size. Consider an
example with three cities and five cues:
City A City B City C
c1 0 0 1
c2 0 2 1
c3 2 1 0
c4 2 1 0
c5 2 1 0
Here TT2B produces the judgments that City A is larger than City B; B is larger than C;
and C is larger than A. Similar examples can be produced for n > 2. The point, as before,
is that natural ways of improving the accuracy of TTB, such as going semilexicographic
or generalizing to TTNB, create new opportunities for incoherence.
This example lends plausibility to the idea that there could be a more general tradeoff
between accuracy and coherence in cognition. But one example does not demonstrate
a tradeoff, nor does it provide any explanatory illumination. To show that there is a
systematic accuracy-coherence tradeoff, I consider two intermediate factors which trade
off against coherence: strategic variety and cognitive complexity. In each case, I argue,
privileging coherence over the intermediate factor often comes at the expense of accuracy.
The result of this discussion will be two ways in which an accuracy-coherence tradeoff
can be produced.
12While a full study of the accuracy of TTNB is beyond the scope of this paper, one way to see that it is
likely to be an accuracy improvement is to note that for n large, TTNB converges to equal-weighted linear
choice, or tallying, which in many contexts is held to perform about as well as linear regression (Dawes and
Corrigan 1974; Dawes 1979).
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4 Coherence and strategic variety
Cognitive strategies can produce incoherence in one of two ways. First, there is the risk of
internal incoherence: the tendency of a single strategy to produce judgments or decisions
that fail to cohere with other judgments and decisions produced by the same strategy.
Second, there is the risk of external incoherence: the tendency of a strategy to produce
judgments or decisions that fail to cohere with judgments and decisions produced by
other strategies that the agent employs.
Some agents avoid the risk of external incoherence by using only a single cognitive
strategy throughout their lifetimes. For example, agents can avoid external incoherence
in their credences by always updating through Bayesian conditionalization. But it is
usually held that heuristic cognizers do and should employ a large toolbox of different
heuristic strategies for judgment and decisionmaking (Gigerenzer and Selten 2001). Be-
cause no heuristic strategy performs well in all environments, it would be inappropriate
for heuristic cognizers to use the same strategy to solve all problems. Rather, heuristic
cognizers learn to switch flexibly between various strategies according to the demands of
each situation (Marewski and Schooler 2011; Payne et al. 1988).
Now consider a heuristic cognizer deciding how many cognitive strategies she will
employ. Plausibly, many such agents confront an accuracy-coherence tradeoff in setting
the size of their toolbox. On the one hand, up to a point, increasing the size of her toolbox
increases the expected accuracy of the agent’s judgments and expected quality of her
decisions. This happens because increasing the size of her toolbox means that the agent
is more likely to have appropriate strategies available to confront any given situation. On
the other hand, increasing the size of her toolbox may decrease the expected coherence of
an agent’s beliefs and preferences. Each strategy added to the toolbox increases the risk of
external incoherence by creating the real possibility that different strategies will be applied
to similar or identical problems throughout her lifetime. Because there is no guarantee
that different strategies will give similar answers to similar problems, the agent may be
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led to make radically different judgments or decisions in similar or identical judgment
and choice problems.
Cashing out this plausibility argument in full generality would be a harrowing task.
First, we would need to assess the effects of strategic variety on the lifetime judgments and
decisions made by an agent. This task risks empirical intractability. And second, we would
need to measure the accuracy and coherence of the resulting judgments and decisions.
This task risks overreliance on particularities of our favorite measure.13 However, we can
illustrate the way in which increasing strategic variety often generates a quality-coherence
tradeoff by focusing on cases of repeated decisionmaking, then modify this discussion to
illustrate an accuracy-coherence tradeoff.
Suppose that every week you are faced with the choice between two brands of cereal.
Here are two ways you might decide which cereal to purchase. First, you might decide
using considered defaults. On your first trip to the grocery store, you would choose a cereal
using a cognitively demanding heuristic, for example by tallying (Dawes and Corrigan
1974) the positive features on which each cereal comes out better, then choosing the cereal
with the most positive features. You could spend a good deal of time gathering and
retrieving information from memory and from your environment to inform this choice.
On subsequent trips, you would choose by default (Johnson and Goldstein 2003), picking
the same cereal that you first selected. You would continue in this way until reassessment
was triggered, for example because a set amount of time had elapsed or new information
indicated that redeliberation could be called for. Then you would once again choose
using a cognitively demanding heuristic, subsequently continuing to choose by default
as before.
Second, you might use a consistent strategy method, redeliberating each time using a
simple heuristic such as lexicographic choice. This method would require you to use a
simpler heuristic to make your initial decision, in order to balance deliberation costs, but
would allow you to reopen deliberation during each shopping trip in order to respond to
13See Staffel (2020) for an overview of divergences for measuring degrees of coherence.
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new information.
The considered default method differs from the consistent strategy method in that
it mixes two different decisionmaking strategies. This opens the door to incoherence.
Suppose that on your first trip (t0), you choose Mighty Muesli (X) over Good Granola (Y).
Gradually, the makers of Mighty Muesli begin shrinking the size of boxes and increasing
their price, and you notice these changes. You continue choosing by default, so that on
your penultimate trip (tn−1) you choose Mighty Muesli (X′) over Good Granola (Y′). Here
the prospects X,Y have been replaced with X′,Y′ to reflect changes in decision-relevant
features such as size and price. But on your last trip (tn) redeliberation is triggered,
for example because sufficient time has elapsed, or because the store comes under new
management and this change suggests that redeliberation may be in order. Although the
price, quality and other features of Mighty Muesli (X′) and Good Granola (Y′) have not
changed since last week, you now choose Good Granola over Mighty Muesli based on the
changes in price and quality since t0.
It is often held as a requirement of coherence that strict preferences be asymmetric:
(Asymmetry of Strict Preference) For all prospects X,Y: X  Y or Y  X.
Your choice of Mighty Muesli at tn−1 reveals the weak preference X′ < Y′, and your
choice of Good Granola at tn reveals the weak preference Y′ < X′. This is not yet a case
of symmetric strict preference. But we can modify the example to induce symmetric
strict preferences. Suppose that at tn−1, Good Granola was discounted by ten cents,
and represent this discounted prospect as Y∗. Your choice at tn−1 then reveals the weak
preference X′ < Y∗, and presumably you enjoy free money, giving Y∗  Y′. It follows that
at tn−1 you have X′  Y′, on pain of another form of incoherence, namely intransitivity.
And by a similar device we can induce Y′  X′ at tn. In this way, considered default choice
can lead to incoherence in the form of symmetric strict preferences.
Because this example is diachronic, it might be objected that diachronic symmetry
of preference can reveal rationally permissible preference change rather than diachronic
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incoherence. But the problem is that standard signs of diachronically coherent prefer-
ence change are not present in this example. On the one hand, we want to allow that
agents may sometimes change their fundamental preferences over time, for example by
acquiring a taste for granola or by undergoing transformative experiences which rewrite
their personality. But this is not what happened here. The agent has not, we may stip-
ulate, come to love granola or transformed her personality in any way. She has merely
reopened deliberation. On the other hand, we want to allow that agents may change their
preferences in response to changing evidence. But we saw that the relevant features of
Good Granola and Mighty Muesli have not changed between tn−1 and tn. On some ways
of elaborating the method of considered default choice, the agent has acquired a flimsy
piece of new evidence: that the store is under new management. But on other tellings,
for example when redeliberation is triggered after a set number of shopping trips, no new
evidence has been acquired.14
So far, we have seen that the considered default method opens the door to incoher-
ence. Note next that the consistent strategy method may, in expectation, produce less
incoherence in this and similar applications. Suppose that the agent consistently chooses
using lexicographic choice, as in Section 3. Lexicographic choice cannot produce strict
preference symmetries in the way illustrated above, because lexicographic choosers never
change their choices without change of relevant evidence. And in many situations, lexico-
graphic choice may be less vulnerable to preference-reversals of other kinds. Suppose that
the agent regards quality as the most important attribute of cereals. Our lexicographic
chooser will initially pick Mighty Muesli over Good Granola based on its superior qual-
ity. And as Mighty Muesli shrinks vastly in size and increases dramatically in price, our
lexicographic chooser will continue to buy Mighty Muesli based on its superior quality.
14Of course, we may always restore coherence by insisting that something, such as the self-locating
fact that it is now tn triggered a preference change by providing direct evidence about the quality of the
prospects X′,Y′. But on many ways of filling out the example, this move is unmotivated and psychologically
unconvincing. The agent may well tell us that she does not now (and did not at tn−1) treat self-locating
evidence as significantly relevant to her cereal choice. (Similar remarks apply to a move which differentiates
the prospects X′,Y′ of receiving cereal at tn−1 from the prospects X′′,Y′′ of receiving cereal at tn).
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But the coherence of our lexicographic chooser comes at the cost of decision quality.
She is coherent precisely because of her stubborn refusal to reverse her initial choice based
on changes in decision-relevant variables such as cost and size. Whereas our considered
default chooser eventually (and incoherently) changes her mind and purchases what is
now a better cereal, the lexicographic chooser consistently continues to choose what is now
a worse product, because there is no point at which she can spare the deliberative resources
to recognize that it is worse. In this way, the example illustrates how a quality-coherence
tradeoff can arise between the increased decision quality and decreased coherence gained
from increasing the variety of decisionmaking strategies used.
Structurally similar examples can be used to illustrate an accuracy-coherence tradeoff,
in which an increased variety of strategies for forming judgments produces, in expectation,
more accurate but less coherent judgments. Keep the same example, but suppose now that
you are shopping on behalf of your Aunt Edna. Each time, you ask yourself what your
Aunt Edna would prefer. Here are two ways in which you might make this judgment.
First, you could employ a think-rethink strategy of remaking the judgment each time
using a simple heuristic rule. For example, you could use the heuristic TTB, which we saw
in Section 3 is structurally analogous to lexicographic choice. Second, you could employ
a think-retrieve-rethink strategy. You would begin by using a more demanding heuristic or
nonheuristic strategy on your first shopping trip to judge what Edna would prefer. On
subsequent trips, you would search memory for a stored belief about Edna’s preferences,
and would accept this belief without redeliberation.15 You would continue in this way
until redeliberation was prompted, for example because enough time had elapsed or
because evidence suggested redeliberation might be in order. Then you would deliberate
again using a demanding strategy. The think-retrieve-rethink strategy is analogous to
considered default choice.
As before, following the think-retrieve-rethink strategy opens the door to incoherence.
15This is similar to the initial retrieval step in the probabilistic mental models approach (Gigerenzer et al.
1991).
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At tn−1 you would judge that Edna strictly prefers Mighty Muesli to Good Granola, and
at tn you would judge that Edna strictly prefers Good Granola to Mighty Muesli. This
threatens to violate the requirement for judgments to be consistent:
(Judgmental Consistency) For all collections {Ai} of propositions, if ∧iAi is a
contradiction, then you ought not (judge that A1 and . . . and judge that An).
On most tellings, the judgments that Edna would prefer Mighty Muesli at tn−1 but prefer
Good Granola at tn are inconsistent with the agent’s background judgments about cereals
and about Edna. For example, the agent may judge that Edna has not changed her cereal
preference between tn−1 and tn. And this judgment is inconsistent with her judgments
about Edna’s preferences at tn−1 and tn.
Again as before, the think-rethink strategy avoids this type of incoherence because
TTB cannot produce different judgments without a change in relevant information. As
a result, the think-rethink strategy may outperform the think-retrieve-rethink strategy
in expected coherence over this and similar judgment problems. But the think-rethink
strategy gains in coherence precisely by refusing to change its mind, and continuing at tn
to make the false judgment that Edna would prefer what is now a much smaller and more
expensive cereal. The think-rethink strategy purchases an increase in expected coherence
by a decrease in expected accuracy. This illustrates how an accuracy-coherence tradeoff
can arise from considerations of strategic variety.
In this section, we have seen that considerations of strategic variety can induce both
quality-coherence and accuracy-coherence tradeoffs. For many agents, increasing the
variety of cognitive strategies that they use will increase the expected accuracy of their
judgments and quality of their decisions, but open the door to new forms of incoherence.
In the next section, I argue that increasing cognitive complexity is a second way to induce
quality-coherence and accuracy-coherence tradeoffs.
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5 Coherence and cognitive complexity
It is often observed that nonhuman animals think and act more coherently than humans do
(Searle 2001; Stanovich 2013). Whereas human judgment and decisionmaking is subject to
many forms of probabilistic, logical and decision-theoretic incoherence (Kahneman et al.
1982; Gilovich et al. 2002), many of these errors are less-often found in animal cognition,
and they are most frequently documented in relatively sophisticated animals (Krupenye
et al. 2015; Marsh and Kacelnik 2002). This trend continues down to the limiting case of
plant cognition, in which no credible incoherence has been documented (Schmid 2016).
What explains this striking negative correlation between complexity and coherence?
A natural explanation is that there is often a coherence-complexity tradeoff in cognition
(Stanovich 2013). By representing and processing information in more complex ways, we
increase our risk of making incoherent judgments and decisions. This happens because
more sophisticated processes can produce forms of incoherence which simpler rules avoid.
Why, then, would sophisticated creatures choose to employ more complex repre-
sentations and processing rules when they could instead use simpler ones? A natural
suggestion is that increasing cognitive complexity conduces to other cognitive goods, and
in particular increases the expected accuracy of judgments and the expected quality of
decisions.16 If that is right, then the complexity-coherence tradeoff will often give rise to
an accuracy-coherence tradeoff. In choosing to use complex cognitive processes, agents
accept a heightened risk of incoherence in exchange for a better chance of making accurate
judgments and good decisions.17
We can see how the complexity-coherence tradeoff arises by considering two factors
16As emphasized in Section 2, the claim is that complexity and accuracy often trade off, not that they
always do. That is the lesson of less-is-more effects (Geman et al. 1992; Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009).
17One piece of corroborating evidence comes from accounts of the evolution of cognitive complexity,
which emphasize that cognitive complexity arose in order to allow agents to cope with environmental
complexity (Godfrey-Smith 2002; Powell et al. 2017). The ability of complex strategies to capture complex
variation in problem contexts is, quite plausibly, a source of incoherence. Because complex processes can
represent and respond to more complex arrays of problem features, there is more opportunity for us to react
very differently to similar or identical situations by representing and processing these situations differently.
On this point see Stanovich (2013).
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which drive it. In fact, these factors are ubiquitous enough that we can illustrate both of
them using examples already considered above.18
First, as creatures consider larger quantities or more complex types of information,
they have an increased need to flexibly manage information utilization during decision-
making. It becomes increasingly impossible to consider all relevant information during
decisionmaking, so agents must decide which information to consider on a given occasion
based on local task demands. This means that different bodies of information can be used
to make judgments or decisions involving the same object on different occasions, creating
an opportunity for incoherence.
By way of illustration, consider the turn from lexicographic to semilexicographic choice
in Section 3. Semilexicographic choice differs from lexicographic choice precisely in its
selective willingness to consider additional information. If two options are nearly tied
along a given cue, semilexicographic choice moves on to consider additional cues rather
than halting and making a decision. This is, in many contexts, an excellent way to
decide when more information is needed, since the presence of near-ties suggests that the
currently-favored option may not be overall better than its competitor.
However, it is precisely this feature of semilexicographic choice that gives rise to in-
transitive preferences. Additional information is consulted in determining the preference
between Car A and Car B, as well as between Car B and Car C, because near-ties arise
in both cases. But no additional information is consulted to determine the preference
between Car A and Car C, allowing an intransitive cycle of preferences to be formed.
As we have seen, we could remove the risk of intransitivity by reducing our informa-
tion utilization, retreating from semilexicographic choice back to lexicographic choice.19
But we saw in Section 3 that this would plausibly come at the expense of expected deci-
18For brevity, I focus on the case of decisionmaking, since we have already seen how these examples can
be reworked to reveal analogous phenomena in judgment formation.
19Of course, we could also block the issue by always considering all available information. However,
that is often infeasible for bounded agents, just like it is often infeasible to draw all relevant inferences.
More generally, it’s not clear that there is any ‘quick fix’ that will reduce the risk of incoherence without
substantial increases in effort or inaccuracy. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pushing me to address
this possibility.
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sion quality. The turn from lexicographic to semilexicographic choice reduces expected
coherence by making flexible use of additional information, but this information is often
decision-relevant, hence the reduction in expected coherence comes with an increase in
expected decision quality.20
A second way that the complexity-coherence tradeoff arises is in deliberative resource
management. As we employ more complex forms of processing, we need to increasingly
ration deliberative resources by being selective about when complex processes are em-
ployed and how much effort is put into complex processes when they are used.21 The
problem is that rational management of deliberative resources involves starkly contrasting
investments of deliberative resources into different tasks. When one and the same object
features in two different tasks, we can produce different judgments or decisions involving
that object, not because our evidence has changed but rather because of a change in how
we deliberate.
Return again to the method of considered default choice from Section 4. Considered
default choice involves using an effortful process to make the initial choice between
Mighty Muesli and Good Granola, then continuing to make that same choice by default
until contextual information suggests that redeliberation could be in order. As we saw,
considered default choice can produce asymmetric patterns of strict preference because
redeliberation may reverse our previous defaults without any change in the characteristics
of Mighty Muesli and Good Granola.
We could eliminate this vulnerability by simplifying considered default choice in a
striking way: never redeliberate. Using this strategy, if you buy Mighty Muesli once then
you will continue buying it until one of the cereals is discontinued. This simplification
20A similar phenomenon is illustrated by humans’ heightened vulnerability to attribute framing, in
which our evaluations of an object are affected by how an attribute of that object is presented (Levin et al.
1998). On the prevailing account, attribute framing happens when rich, semantically-valanced mental
representations trigger a valence-consistent shift in processes such as attention and memory retrieval (Jain
et al. 2020; Levin et al. 1998). This need not always be irrational, insofar as semantic linkages between
cognitive representations are valuable information which is often better used than ignored. But it does
create the possibility for incoherence when oppositely-valenced representations are triggered by different
presentations of the same decision problem. For other work on rational framing effects see (Bermúdez 2020).
21On operationalizing the notion of mental effort, see Shenhav et al. (2017).
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removes the threat of incoherence in a blunt way, by refusing to invest more deliberative
resources even when contextual information suggests that it is time to reevaluate your
options. This is exactly the type of stubbornness that we took as evidence of reduced
decision quality in a more complex method, the consistent strategy method in Section
4. By the same token, we should think that the stubbornness of default choice without
redeliberation comes with a reduction in expected decision quality.22
In this section, we have seen two ways that a complexity-coherence tradeoff between
cognitive complexity and coherence can be generated. First, using more and more com-
plex information generates a need for selective information utilization policies, allowing
different information to be used to evaluate the same object in different contexts. Sec-
ond, employing complex processes creates a heightened need for deliberative resource
management, allowing different judgments and decisions to be made about the same ob-
ject when different types and quantities of deliberative resources are brought to bear on
evaluating it. In both cases, we saw how the complexity-coherence tradeoff can give rise
to an accuracy-coherence tradeoff, because appropriate use of more complex information
and deliberative processes can increase expected accuracy and decision quality, even as it
creates new opportunities for incoherence.
This completes my argument for the existence of an accuracy-coherence tradeoff in
cognition. In the next section, I raise a puzzle about the possibility of an accuracy-
coherence tradeoff. I use this puzzle to introduce an important distinction that will help
us to locate the accuracy-coherence tradeoff within the structure of an agent’s cognition.
22Strategies for deliberative resource management also contribute to the variety-coherence tradeoff across
decision contexts. One of the major impetuses for applying different strategies to similar problems is that
varying stakes or other changes in problem context make a differential investment of deliberative resources
appropriate in each context. As we saw, shifts in strategy can be a source of incoherence, even if the shift is
towards a more accurate and demanding strategy.
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6 Locating the accuracy-coherence tradeoff
Sections 3-5 argued for the existence of accuracy-coherence and quality-coherence trade-
offs in cognition. Bounded agents are often forced to choose between structuring their
cognition in ways most conductive to accuracy and decision quality or most conducive
to coherence. In the special case of judgmental accuracy, this finding poses a puzzle. We
began our discussion by noting that there are strong provable connections between the
accuracy and coherence of belief states. These connections seem to place principled limits
on the degree to which accuracy and coherence can trade off during cognition. This may
suggest that the arguments for an accuracy-coherence tradeoff have been overstated. But
where did we go wrong?
For concreteness, it will help to rehearse a few of the connections that I have in mind.
Fix a scoring ruleImeasuring the inaccuracy of credal states and a divergence d measuring
the distance between credal states. Say that credence function c strictly I-dominates c′ if
in all possible worlds, c is less inaccurate than c′. Say that c weakly I-dominates c′ if in
all worlds c is no more inaccurate than c′, and in some world c is less inaccurate than c′.
Accuracy dominance, at least in its strict form, is often taken as a strong sign of accuracy
superiority.
One way to improve the coherence of a credence function is to move in a straight line
towards a nearby coherent credence function. For any credence function c, a d-nearest
coherent credence function c∗ is any coherent credence function which lies at a minimal
distance from c among the set of all coherent credence functions. Across a range of
plausible candidates for I and d (Staffel 2020), it turns out that moving towards a nearest
coherent credence function always produces a result strictly dominating the original
function c:
(Linear Improvement) If c is an incoherent credence function and c∗ is a d-
nearest coherent credence function to c, then for any λ ∈ (0, 1) the credence
function λc + (1 − λ)c∗ strictly I-dominates c.
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In this sense, moving towards coherence is a good way to improve the accuracy of a
credence function.
More generally, we can measure the degree of incoherence of a credence function c as the
distance under d between c and a d-nearest coherent credence function. Say that credence
function c is more coherent than c′ just in case c has a lower degree of incoherence than
does c′. Across a range of assumptions (Staffel 2020), we can establish a close relationship
between dominance and degrees of coherence:
(Dominance-to-Coherence) For all credence functions c and c′:
I If c weakly I-dominates c′, then c is not more incoherent than c′.
II If c strictly I-dominates c’, then c is less incoherent than c′.
Together, Dominance-to-Coherence and Linear Improvement suggest that the coherence
and accuracy of credal states will not diverge very far. While these results stop short of
showing that coherence and accuracy march in lock-step, it would be odd in view of these
results if there turned out to be a strong negative correlation between the accuracy and
coherence of credal states, considered in isolation.
How, then, could there be an accuracy-coherence tradeoff in cognition? The answer
is that we went looking for this tradeoff in the wrong place. Herbert Simon held that
the fundamental turn in the study of bounded rationality is the turn from substantive to
procedural rationality (Simon 1976).23 Theories of substantive rationality ask normative
questions about the outcomes of deliberation such as credences and preferences, without
considering the processes of deliberation that produced them. Theories of procedural
rationality pay explicit attention to the processes of deliberation through which these
outcomes are produced.
23This terminology is unfortunate, because Simon’s distinction between substantive and procedural
rationality is independent of the coherence-based theorist’s distinction between substantive and structural
rationality. In this section, I use ‘substantive rationality’ in Simon’s sense. In Section 7, I use it in the
coherentist’s sense.
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Most theorists in the bounded tradition have followed Simon in holding that substan-
tive rationality is a misleading lens through which to study bounded rationality. The
problem for theories of substantive rationality is that if we only study the outcomes of
deliberation, we will neglect important cognitive bounds such as the costs of cognition
and limitations on our ability to make certain inferences and decisions. If we do not model
the process of deliberation, these bounds will fall outside of our models.
As a fact about substantive rationality, it may be quite right to say that there is a strong
correlation between the coherence and accuracy of credal states, considered in isolation
from the processes that produced them. But when we zoom out to examine the processes
of deliberation through which credences are produced, the correlation between accuracy
and coherence breaks down. In order to increase the coherence of our credences, we need
to make specifiable changes to the cognitive processes through which these credences are
produced. The lesson of Sections 3-5 is that after a point, these changes begin to have
unsavory consequences for the accuracy of an agent’s credences. These consequences are
revealed by examining the ways in which an agent’s cognitive processes would have to
change in order to produce more coherent judgments, together with the accuracy-costs of
employing these processes.
The resulting tension between accuracy and coherence is not revealed by results such as
Linear Improvement and Dominance-to-Coherence which deal directly with the accuracy
and coherence of credence functions but make no mention of the processes of delibera-
tion that produced them. The accuracy-coherence tradeoff appears only at the level of
procedural rationality. The fact that important tradeoffs such as the accuracy-coherence
tradeoff are only revealed at the procedural level illustrates the importance of studying
procedural rationality.
In this section, we began with a puzzle. When credences are considered in abstraction
from the processes that produced them, we recover tight connections between coherence
and accuracy. This raised the puzzle of how to make room for an accuracy-coherence
tradeoff in cognition. The answer is that the accuracy-coherence tradeoff is felt most
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strongly at the procedural level of deliberation procedures rather than the substantive
level of beliefs and preferences that result from these procedures. For exactly this reason,
bounded rationality theorists have held that theorizing about bounded rationality occurs
mostly at the procedural level. What implications does this have for the normative place
of coherence in bounded rationality?
7 Normative implications
In the unbounded case, disputes about the normative status of coherence requirements
are not primarily extensional disputes. Coherence-based normative theories hold that
rational agents must have coherent beliefs and preferences, because coherence require-
ments are fundamental requirements of rationality. Their opponents agree that rational
agents must have coherent, or nearly-coherent attitudes, but take this fact to be derivative
on other rational requirements, such as the requirement to hold evidentially supported
beliefs (Kolodny 2005). What is at issue is not, for the most part, what rationality re-
quires but whether the requirements in question are fundamental or derivative. Even
distinguishing between structural and substantive rationality or between oughts and ra-
tional requirements will not bring out significant extensional disagreement, for it is widely
agreed that unbounded agents ought, and are substantively rationally required to hold
mostly coherent attitudes.24
It looks tempting to extend coherence requirements to bounded agents by holding
that bounded agents are rationally required to be as coherent as possible, given their
limitations. But now we arrive at an extensional dispute, because for bounded agents
there is an accuracy-coherence tradeoff between the accuracy and coherence of their
judgments as well as a quality-coherence tradeoff between the quality and coherence of
their preferences or decisions. Now it is tempting to hold that what agents ought to do,
24Some authors go further and target coherence norms in their application to belief, or in the life of
unbounded agents (Arkes et al. 2016; Field forthcoming). An advantage of the present approach is that it
does not require us to go this far.
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and what substantive rationality requires them to do, is not to pursue coherence at all
costs, but rather to adopt cognitive strategies which sacrifice some amount of expected
coherence for the sake of improvements in accuracy and decision quality. This leaves
coherence-based theories with three options.25
First, they can say that the requirement for bounded agents to be as coherent as possible
is a requirement of structural rather than substantive rationality, or a rational requirement
rather than a statement about what ought to be done. The ensuing dialectic is familiar, but
the tone has changed. It is now conceded that what agents ought to do or what substantive
rationality requires them to do is not always, or even perhaps for the most part to be as
coherent as possible. This means that there is a central normative sense in which many
agents may be uncriticizable, or even praiseworthy for failures to pursue coherence.
Second, coherence-based theories may not lean on these distinctions and may instead
make the stronger claim that what agents ought to do and what they are rationally required
to do is to pursue coherence at all costs. But now Kolodny’s (2005) challenge returns with
a vengeance: why be rational? In the present context, the challenge strengthens to the
following: why be rational, instead of structuring our cognitive lives in ways expected
to produce more accurate judgments and better decisions? This is a tough question to
answer, and it threatens to tell against coherence-based accounts.
Finally, coherence-based theories could concede that overall rational requirements are
partially informed by considerations of accuracy and decision quality, which trade off
against coherence.26 This would involve denying that bounded agents are rationally
required to be as coherent as possible. This move raises interesting normative questions,
of which I highlight two examples below.27
25How about a fourth option: once you’ve settled on a broad class of cognitive strategies, you should
strive to implement those strategies as coherently as possible? In general, I’m not opposed to emphasizing
coherence in later steps of strategy-selection, although I suspect it might be a bit strong to give coherence
complete priority over other goals at later stages of strategy selection. Thanks to an anonymous referee for
pushing me on this point.
26Or relatedly, they could follow Broome (2013) in letting rationality be exhausted by coherence, but
treating rationality as one of many considerations bearing on how we ought to cognize.
27This may also put pressure against attempts to account for heuristic rationality on grounds of accuracy,
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First, classic experiments from the heuristics and biases program show that heuristic
strategies can sometimes produce incoherent attitudes. Defenders of heuristic cognition
counter that these occasional biases are the predictable result of rational heuristic pro-
cedures for judgment and decisionmaking. Although heuristics occasionally produce
incoherent judgments, they may nonetheless strike the best balance between accuracy
and coherence in cognition. If this is right, then in what sense, if any, are agents rationally
criticizable for forming incoherent attitudes as a result of heuristic cognition? Might we
go so far as to say that there is no sense in which they are rationally criticizable, for they
would have been irrational to cognize in any other way?28
Second, if accuracy and decision quality are to trade off against coherence in determin-
ing what rationality requires, then how are these considerations to be weighed against
one another?29 Presumably, coherence-based theories want to avoid a view on which
accuracy and decision quality should always outweigh considerations of incoherence, but
it is not easy to see how this tradeoff is to be made. Moreover, ardent defenders of an
accuracy-centered approach to epistemology may claim that accuracy should always take
precedence over coherence in judgment, and many, such as utilitarians, might claim that
decision quality should always take precedence over coherence in decisionmaking. This
raises the challenge of saying how and why coherence should be allowed to trade off
against accuracy and decision quality.
Summing up, we have seen that bounded agents face accuracy-coherence and quality-
coherence tradeoffs, in which the accuracy and quality of cognitive processes trades
off against their expected coherence in many cognitive contexts. These tradeoffs arise
because subsidiary factors such as strategic variety and cognitive complexity often increase
expected accuracy and quality, but decrease expected coherence. Taking these tradeoffs
without inducing downstream revisions to familiar epistemological principles (Karlan forthcoming).
28For recent philosophical attempts to vindicate cognitive biases, see Hedden (2019), Icard (2018), Morton
(2017), and Polonioli (2013).
29See Worsnip (forthcoming) for discussion of the difficulty of weighing coherence against substantive
considerations such as accuracy in deliberation.
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seriously highlights the need for theories of bounded rationality to attend to procedural
rationality, since it is at this level that the tradeoff appears. These tradeoffs also restrict
the form of defensible coherence-based approaches to rationality, and raise interesting
normative questions that are deserving of further study.
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